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This project is designed to provide a policy recommendation for transitioning custody of 
NAVSEA’s Interim Supply Support to NAVSUP based on the analysis of current 
business practices at NAVSEA, NAVICP-P and NAVAIR.  NAVSEA has identified that 
it has OM&S valued at $7.386 billion; ISS is a subset of OM&S.  Decisions made in the 
ISS phase may result in the Navy buying parts that will receive zero demand.  In effect, 
ISS is a birthplace, but not the only birthplace, of some OM&S that are eventually 
categorized as excess material.  A more efficient ISS process would result in lower 
excess material and financial savings.  The data set analyzed contained ISS purchased by 
both NAVAIR and NAVSEA, as well as demand data.  Additionally, analysis of current 
ISS processes at NAVAIR and NAVSEA was conducted.  The research resulted in 
finding that NAVAIR and NAVICP-P have partnered in ISS management.  The 
recommendations are that, in transitioning NAVSEA’s ISS to NAVSUP, a partnership 
must be formed that develops clear business rules allowing NAVSEA input into ISS 
management, and that NAVICP-M should develop a dedicated staff to provide ISS 
support to NAVSEA’s Program Management Offices.  
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  BACKGROUND OF PROBLEM ............................................................1 
B.  STATEMENT OF PROBLEM .................................................................3 
C.  HISTORY ...................................................................................................4 
D.  PURPOSE OF STUDY ..............................................................................5 
E.  SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBLEMS ..........................................................5 
F.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................6 
G.  SCOPE ........................................................................................................6 
H.  SUMMARY ................................................................................................6 
II.  REVIEW OF INSTRUCTIONS, AUDITS AND PROCEDURES ....................9 
A.  INSTRUCTIONS .......................................................................................9 
1.  SECNAVINST 4440.33 ..................................................................9 
2.  SECNAVINST 4440.33A .............................................................10 
3.  NAVSEAINST 4440.24D .............................................................10 
4.  NAVSUP 4400.93A ......................................................................11 
5.  CAO CONOPS:  Competency Aligned Organization 
Concept of Operations for the Naval Air Systems 
Command and the Affiliated Program Executive 
Offices, 25 August 2010 ...............................................................11 
B.  AUDITS ....................................................................................................14 
1.  GAO Report: Defense Inventory Management Actions 
Needed to Improve the Cost Efficiency of Inventory ...............14 
2.  GAO Report: DoD’S 2010 Comprehensive Inventory 
Management Improvement Plan Addressed Statutory 
Requirements but Faces Implementation Challenges. .............15 
3.  Naval Audit Service Report:  Reporting of Sponsor-
Owned Material and Government-Owned Material ................16 
4.  Logistics Management Institute Report: Life Cycle 
Forecasting Improvement:  Causative Research and 
Item Introduction Phase ..............................................................17 
C.  PROCEDURES ........................................................................................18 
1.  NAVAIR Interim Supply Support .............................................19 
2.  NAVSEA Interim Supply Support .............................................20 
III.  METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................23 
A.  RESEARCH QUESTION .......................................................................23 
B.  DATA ANALYSIS ...................................................................................24 
C.  REVIEW OF POLICY ............................................................................25 
D.  PROCESS MAPPING .............................................................................25 
IV.  DATA ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................27 
A.  INTRODUCTION....................................................................................27 
B.  NUMERICAL DATA ..............................................................................27 
 viii
1.  NAVAIR Data Summary ............................................................27 
2.  NAVSEA Data Summary ............................................................32 
C.  POLICIES ................................................................................................35 
1.  NAVAIR’s Capabilities Aligned Organization .........................35 
2.  Logistics Element Managers and NAVICP ...............................39 
3.  NAVSEA’s Hierarchical Structure ............................................41 
D.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................43 
V.  FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................45 
A.  FINDINGS ................................................................................................45 
1.  Introduction ..................................................................................45 
2.    Incentivizing Item Managers ......................................................46 
3.  Lack of Visibility ..........................................................................47 
4.  Poor Estimates During Initial Procurement Planning .............48 
5.  Unpredictable Demand and High Stockout Cost ......................49 
6.  Monopsony and Lack of Competition ........................................50 
7.  Lack of Customer Confidence and Receiving the Wrong 
Part ................................................................................................50 
B.    RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................51 
C.  IMPACT ...................................................................................................54 
D.  LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................54 
E.  FURTHER RESEARCH .........................................................................55 
APPENDIX A.  STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY ...........................................................57 
APPENDIX B.  GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................59 
APPENDIX C.  PROVISIONING CANDIDATE CHECKLIST ................................65 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................73 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  NAVAIR Operating Principles (From NAVAIR, 2010) ..............................13 
Figure 2.  Locations of ISS Contractor Facilities (From Sayen, 2001) .........................20 
Figure 3.  Visible Consumption Versus Quarters Until System Reaches MSD ............30 
Figure 4.  NAVAIR Operating Relationships (From NAVAIR, 2011, p.5). ................36 
Figure 5.  Simplified Example of the Tradeoff Between Safety Stock and Service 
Level .............................................................................................................37 
Figure 6.  Provisioning Performance Schedule (From NAVAIR, 2008) ......................38 
Figure 7.  NAVAIR Provisioning Candidate Checklist Flowchart ...............................41 
Figure 8.  U.S. Navy Shore Organization (From United States Navy, 2006) ...............58 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  NAVAIR ISS Demand for Currently Active ISILs from 2001–2010 ..........28 
Table 2.  ISIL Visible Consumption ............................................................................31 
Table 3.  Sample NAVSEA Data .................................................................................33 
Table 4.  NAVSEA Visible Consumption Summary ...................................................34 
Table 5.  Occurrences of NIINs in RICs ......................................................................35 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AERP Advanced Equipment Repair Program 
CARPER Carrier Planned Equipment Replacement Program 
CCE Class Common Equipment 
CFM Contractor Furnished Material 
COSAL Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List 
DMI Direct Material Inventory 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoN Department of the Navy 
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
GOM Government-Owned Material  
ICP Inventory Control Point  
IOC Initial Operational Capability.   
I-NICN Interim Navy Item Control Number 
ISAL Interim Support Allowance List 
ISEAs In Service Engineering Agents 
ISIL Interim Support Items List  
ISS Interim Supply Support  
LEM Logistics Element Manager 
LLTM Long Lead Time Material 
MSD Material Support Date  
MSP Material Support Program 
NAS Navy Audit Service  
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command  
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command  
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command  
NIIN National Item Identification Number 
NSA Naval Support Activity  
OM&S Operating Material and Supplies.   
PEO Program Executive Office 
 xiv
PMs Program Managers 
PSD Preliminary Support Document 
RIC Repairable Identification Code 
SOM Sponsor Owned  
TIR Transaction Item Report 
TRIPER Trident Planned Equipment Replacement 
WFC Warfare Center 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors would like to thank Professor Geraldo Ferrer and Professor John 
Khawam for their help and guidance.  Your instruction and support enabled us to 
accomplish this giant project.  Both of you have provided valuable insight and 
perspective that the three of us will carry forward. 
We would also like to thank Professor Ken Euske, who provided us the 
opportunity to work on this project.    
Additionally, the researchers would like to thank and acknowledge Captain Brian 
Drapp, Commander Pamela Dozier, and Lieutenant Commander Scott Stahl for their 
direction, shared interest and support of this project.  Special thanks to Mr. Tom Sayen 
and his LEM Team, Mr. Jim McGilloway, Mr. Jeff Grdic, and Mr. Tom McDonald for 
their time and experience.  We would like to acknowledge LCDR Rex Burman, Mr. Ron 
Nason, Mr. Tom Cutchall, and Captain Keith Sykes for their assistance and time.  
Finally, we would like to thank Ms. Susan Hawthorne for your patience with our poor 
writing ability.   
      –LCDR Steve Osborne 
      –LCDR Fred Skinner 
–LT Ryan Stickel 
I would like to thank my wonderful wife, Stacie, and our son, Gabriel, without 
whose patience none of this would have been possible.  I would also like to thank the 
United States taxpayers who fund the Naval Postgraduate School; this institution of 
higher learning continues the education of the world’s finest military leaders. 
–LCDR Steve Osborne 
I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Esther; your dedication, motivation, and 
support throughout the past 18 months has contributed invaluably to the project.  I could 
not have done this without you.  To my son, Alexander, I thank you so much for being 
such a good son while Daddy was working on the project.  You make me so proud. 
–LCDR Fred Skinner 
 xvi
I would like to thank all of my Professors for their instruction and assistance.  To 
all of my classmates, it has been an honor working and studying with each of you.  I 
would especially like to thank my beautiful wife and best friend, Lydia.  You have stood 
by me during this adventure and gave me the motivation when I needed it.  Your patience 
and understanding enabled me to accomplish my degree and especially this project.  I am 
truly grateful for your support.  To my boys, Jake and Luke, thank you for your 
understanding when daddy had to go back to school. 





A. BACKGROUND OF PROBLEM 
Interim Supply Support (ISS) is a category of material that is used to support the 
installation of new or upgraded systems in the Navy.  It is used to supply repair parts for 
a system from the time when a new system is initially fielded, which is called Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC), until the system reaches a maturity, called Material 
Support Date (MSD).  At MSD, the Navy Supply System should assume full supply 
support of the new system.  ISS is designed to be an inventory control system that allows 
the use of standard Navy supply procedures and databases to manage interim support 
material.  These procedures are used to support government-furnished equipment or 
systems, contractor-furnished equipment or systems, and any other systems or equipment 
acquired by the hardware systems commands. 
ISS is a subset of material that falls within a larger category called Operating 
Material and Supplies (OM&S).  OM&S is composed of thirteen types of material, each 
of them assigned a specific reason code.  The following list shows the reason codes and 
types of material they describe: 
A   Diminishing Manufacturing Sources  
B   Installation and Checkout (I&C) Spares 
C   Lab Support Spares 
D   Initial Load Out Material    
E   Non-Navy Equipment 
F  Shipboard Systems & Equipment  (Items that are repair and returned)  
G Government Furnished Equipment 
H  Interim Supply Support 
I   Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
J   Insurance Spares/Major Shore Spares 
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K  Staged Material Availability 
P   Production and Installation Material 
R   Research and Development 
X  Excess Material 
Currently, there is no standard Navy policy for Interim Supply Support (ISS) 
management.  The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) manages ISS through its 
Program Management Offices, whereas the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
Program Management Offices work with Naval Inventory Control Point-Philadelphia 
(NAVICP-P).  NAVICP-P has a dedicated team that manages ISS for NAVAIR (for more 
detail on the relationship between NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and NAVSUP and the Navy 
Organization as a whole, please see Appendix A).   
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has identified that it has OM&S 
valued at $7.386 billion (NAVSEA, 2004).  ISS is reason code H, and a subset of OM&S.  
Decisions made in the ISS phase may result in the Navy buying parts that will receive 
zero demand.  In fact, ISS is a birthplace, but not the only birthplace, of some OM&S that 
are eventually categorized as excess material.  A more efficient ISS process would result 
in lower excess material and financial savings. 
The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and NAVSEA are currently 
negotiating for NAVSUP to take physical custody of NAVSEA-owned OM&S material.  
NAVSEA will still have control over how this material is utilized, but NAVSUP will 
control the day-to-day management of this material.  NAVSUP has neither policy nor 
doctrine in place to guide this change in custody.  The desired end result of this project is 
to help NAVSUP and NAVSEA develop a policy that results in a more efficient ISS 
process and saves taxpayer money.   
Currently, NAVSEA manages and accounts for project and plant stock at its 
Warfare Centers (WFC), Shipyards, Naval Support Activities (NSAs), and General Fund 
(GF) sites in addition to ensuring management of NAVSEA material held by Naval 
Inventory Control Point Mechanicsburg (NAVICP-M).  Some of the material 
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management programs under the purview of NAVSEA include the following: Carrier 
Planned Equipment Replacement Program (CARPER), Submarine Corporate Component 
Repair Program (SCRP), Advanced Equipment Repair Program (AERP), Trident Planned 
Equipment Replacement (TRIPER) Program, Long Lead Time Material (LLTM) 
Program, Material Support Program (MSP), Class Common Equipment (CCE), Naval 
Shipyard Direct Material Inventory (DMI), Naval Shipyard Future Use Material (FUM), 
Interim Supply Support and Naval Shipyard Shop Stores. Currently not all of the legacy 
material logistics programs that manage this material are planned for transition to Navy 
ERP (Stahl, 2010).  
With the rollout of Navy ERP, OM&S management will be transitioned from the 
various legacy systems used today to Navy ERP.  The functionality required to manage 
Project and Plant stock within Navy ERP currently exists but is limited; understanding its 
ability to meet NAVSEA's complex material logistics requirement has been a herculean 
effort by the NAVSEA Supply team.  Currently, Architecture of Integration Information 
Systems (ARIS) models walk-through and training materials do not exist to the degree of 
detail provided for other Navy ERP functionality.  NAVSUP was funded for inventory 
management modules of Navy ERP that NAVSEA was not funded for.  NAVSEA was 
only funded for a limited Inventory Management (IM) functionality. (Stahl, 2010)  
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
NAVSEA Instruction 4440.24D states:  
The Naval Audit Service (NAS) conducted an audit of the NAVSEA 
Warfare Canters between June 1995 and January 1997 to determine if 
management, control and accounting of sponsor assets were adequate. The 
audit found varying degrees of problems associated with SOM. (Naval Sea 
Systems Command [NAVSEA],2004) 
Further, on 7 January 2011, the GAO is report (GAO-11-240) that stated: 
DoD reported that it currently manages more than 4 million secondary 
inventory items valued at more than $91 billion as of September 2009.  
However, DoD reported that $10.3 billion (11 percent) of its secondary 
inventory has been designated as excess and categorized for potential 
reuse or disposal. (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011, p. 1) 
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NAVSEA currently holds approximately $7.386 billion of OM&S inventory, of 
which a significant portion is ISS.  NAVSEA and NAVSUP’s combined objective is to 
transfer custody of various types of Operating Materials and Supplies (OM&S) from 
NAVSEA to NAVSUP but still have NAVSEA retain control of OM&S use.  No lessons 
learned, best practices, policies or doctrines currently exist to model or guide this move.  
This project will focus on the transition ISS to NAVSUP’s management.   
C. HISTORY 
Previously, NAVSEA and NAVAIR had similar ISS processes where the 
Program Managers had total control of the ISS process.  At that point in time, NAVAIR 
Program Managers often used contractor support to provide ISS.  There were issues with 
cost and a poor interface with the Navy supply system prior to the Material Support Date 
(MSD).  MSD is the date upon which the Navy takes full responsibility for the supply 
support of a system.  NAVSUP cannot direct NAVAIR or NAVSEA to do anything 
without their agreeing to the action.  NAVSUP can put a policy in the instruction, but 
cannot enforce that policy.   This resulted in a Chief of Naval Operations directive to 
reduce costs by improved supply management (Sayen, 2001).  NAVAIR, NAVSUP, and 
NAVICP-P (at that time called the Aviation Supply Office) formed a working group to 
standardize ISS across all NAVAIR Program Management Offices.  At NAVAIR a 
Program Management Office was at that time and still is responsible for all aspects of a 
particular aviation systems life cycle management. 
The working group developed several recommendations that were put into action.  
ISS was to be managed at NAVICP-P under the cognizance of an ISS Coordinator.  This 
coordinator coordinates with 35 Logistics Element Managers (LEM) to ensure they work 
closely with the Program Management Offices for ISS support.  The LEMs are assigned 
to specific Program Management Offices and are responsible for purchasing and 
inventory management of all ISS material for these Program Management Offices. 
Further, all ISS material was to be warehoused centrally through an ISS Oversight 
Center utilizing two warehouses: one in Beaufort, South Carolina, and one in North  
 
 5
Island, California.  These warehouses hold an inventory that currently consists of over 
31,000 different National Stock Number (NSN) items valued at $322 million (Sayen, 
2011).  
D. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This study examines current business rules and procedures used by NAVAIR and 
NAVICP-P to manage aviation ISS as well as NAVSEA to manage surface ISS.  The 
goal is to provide recommendations on developing a more efficient ISS system.  
Specifically, it will address the feasibility of NAVSUP and NAVSEA tailoring policies 
similar to NAVAIR and NAVICP-P for the management of NAVSEA owned ISS after 
transferring OM&S custody from NAVSEA to NAVSUP.  There is much to be learned 
from successful practices at NAVAIR to ensure that the change in custody is successful 
and the ISS process is more cost efficient.   
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBLEMS 
Excess inventory valued in the billions of dollars is an unacceptable practice that 
needs to be remedied.  NAVSUP has been identified as the subject matter expert in 
inventory management.  Their stated mission is: 
With headquarters in Mechanicsburg, Pa., and employing a worldwide 
workforce of more than 24,000 military and civilian personnel, NAVSUP 
oversees logistics programs in the areas of supply operations, conventional 
ordnance, contracting, resale, fuel, transportation, and security assistance. 
(Naval Supply Systems Command [NAVSUP], 2011) 
As a result of this expertise, NAVSUP has been identified by NAVSEA as more 
capable of managing OM&S (NAVSUP, 2011).  NAVAIR and NAVSUP have partnered 
and have demonstrated exceptional inventory-control practices.  This project team will 
analyze these practices to determine if similar practices can be implemented in this 
change of OM&S custody.  Currently, there are no policies in place to help NAVSUP and 
NAVSEA implement a similar arrangement.   
GAO report GAO-11-240 stated that: 
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Since 1990, we have identified DoD supply chain management as a high-
risk area due in part to ineffective and inefficient inventory management 
practices and procedures, weaknesses in accurately forecasting demand for 
spare parts, and challenges in achieving widespread implementation of key 
technologies aimed at improving asset visibility. These factors have 
contributed to the accumulation of billions of dollars in spare parts that are 
excess to current requirements (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2011, 
p. 1).   
While there are differences of opinion between the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and GAO about the disposition of excess material, there is agreement that reducing the 
amount of material DoD buys that ultimately becomes excess will free up money to 
spend on actual needs.  GAO specifically stated, “Inaccurate demand forecasting is the 
leading reason for the accumulation of excess inventory (GAO, 2011).”  Developing a 
more effective plan for ISS will have positive effects on excess inventory.   
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. To what extent will NAVSEA and the Department of the Navy benefit 
from partnering with NAVSUP for ISS management?    
2. How effective is the partnership that currently exists between NAVSUP 
and NAVAIR for ISS Management? 
3. Is greater inventory control by NAVSEA and NAVSUP possible within 
established guidelines or does a new process need to be developed? 
G. SCOPE 
This study does not cover all businesses’ best practices in inventory control.  The 
interviews in this study were conducted in military-sanctioned entities, and results may 
not be universal to general business practices.  This study does not outline the course of 
action to improve ISS management in NAVSEA or NAVSUP, but it provides 
recommendations useful to improve current ISS practices and policies. 
H. SUMMARY 
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter I addresses the background of the 
problem and significance of researching best practices in inventory control to guide 
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NAVSEA’s movement of OM&S to NAVSUP.  It is designed to help the reader gain 
insight on the dilemma NAVSEA currently faces with $7.386 billion in OM&S and how 
partnering with NAVSUP can provide improvements to ISS management and a more cost 
effective process.  Chapter II identifies the foundation for the literature review as it 
focuses on these major areas of this study.  Chapter III will be the methodology used to 
answer the research questions.  Chapter IV will be analysis of the data we have collected.  
Chapter V will provide recommendations about ISS management and areas of follow-on 
study. 
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II. REVIEW OF INSTRUCTIONS, AUDITS AND PROCEDURES 
A. INSTRUCTIONS 
The Navy has numerous instructions governing OM&S.  Each hierarchical level 
has some sort of overarching instruction for its organization and suborganizations.  
Overall guidance is provided by Congress and the president to DoD.  DoD then refines 
that guidance for each service.  Each service further interprets the guidance and passes it 
on.  This process continues to the unit and even individual level.  This review will now 
cover guidance from the more senior levels of DON; including Secretary of the Navy 
Instruction 4440.33 (SECNAVINST 4440.33), Secretary of the Navy Instruction 
4440.33A (SECNAVINST 4440.33A), Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction 
4440.24D   (NAVSEAINST 4440.24D),  Naval Supply Systems Command Instruction 
4400.93A (NAVSUPINST 4400.93A) and  NAVAIR’s CAO CONOPS:  Competency 
Aligned Organization Concept of Operation for the Naval Air Systems Command and the 
Affiliated Program Executive Offices.   
1. SECNAVINST 4440.33 
SECNAVINST 4440.33 entitled, “Sponsor-Owned Material, Government-Owned 
Material And Plant And Project Stock Management,” was released on 11 February 2009.  
It is currently under revision, which is unusual after such a short period. The instruction 
applies to all naval activities related to acquisition, research and development.    This 
revision will be addressed in the discussion of the SECNAVINST 4440.33A.  The 
overarching policy is to minimize SOM/GOM inventories by ensuring that the best value 
life-cycle cost analysis, including holding cost, is utilized to meet acquisition and demand 
profiles for specific programs and systems.  The secondary policy objectives are to 
maximize redistribution of SOM/GOM assets while maintaining accountability and 
maximum visibility.   The tertiary policy objective is to dispose of excess, unrepairable, 
and obsolete (E,U&O) material in accordance with the given rules and regulations.  The 
remainder of the instruction details specific actions and responsibilities of Program  
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Exectutive Offices (PEOs) and Program Managers (PMs).  While this instruction requires 
reporting of SOM/GOM, there are no clearly delineated repercussions for a failure to 
comply with the instruction. 
2. SECNAVINST 4440.33A 
SECNAVINST 4440.33 had several weaknesses that were identified by both the 
Naval Audit Service and the GAO.  SECNAVINST 4440.33A is a revision of 
SECNAVINST 4440.33 that addresses the weaknesses. This is a draft copy, it is not 
official yet, and could still be changed.  The major aspect of the draft instruction  is that it 
delineates repercussions for failure to comply with the instruction.  It also clearly 
delineates the reporting requirements and to whom the reports are required to be made.    
A specific quote from the instruction is that, “Noncompliance to this instruction may lead 
to ASN(RD&A) designating this as an ‘area of interest’ for NAVAUDSVC follow-up 
audits.”  This instruction also specifically changes SOM/GOM to OM&S because it is the 
proper financial accounting term for this type of material (SECNAV, 2011).   
3. NAVSEAINST 4440.24D 
NAVSEA issued NAVSEAINST 4440.24D, Sponsor Owned Material (SOM) 
Management on 20 December 2004.  It defines procedures for control, management, 
visibility, accountability, and access to SOM while assigning responsibility and 
establishing policy.  The goal is to accurately record and report SOM inventory and 
financial reports to optimize visibility and accountability through total asset visibility 
procedures.  Successfully utilizing this instruction will allow the determination of 
retention levels of SOM necessary to support all requirements while minimizing 
inventory levels through responsible means of disposal.  This instruction does not pertain 
to nuclear propulsion material or conventional ammunition.  As with SECNAVINST 
4440.33, there are no consequences for failure to comply with the instruction.  It requires 
a lot of reporting and data collection, but it never specifies to whom to report the data, or 
consequences of failure to report.  Consequently, this lack of centralized reporting has 
posed challenges in data collection about OM&S (NAS, 2010).  Another weakness of this 
instruction is that it provides direction for actions that NAVSEA is requiring NAVSUP to 
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complete.  NAVSUP is an equivalent command and is not required to comply with the 
direction of NAVSEA.  There is no indication that NAVSUP agreed to take the action 
required by this instruction. 
4. NAVSUP 4400.93A 
The Naval Supply Systems Command has an instruction governing ISS, 
NAVSUP 4400.93A issued on 12 October 1999 and entitled, “Interim Supply Support 
(ISS) for Weapon System and Equipment.”  It provided policy on the use of ISS and a 
plan for an orderly transition from ISS to full government support.  The instruction 
directs Hardware Systems Commands such as NAVSEA and NAVAIR to include ISS 
planning and transition at the Material Support Date (MSD) in their acquisition process.  
Once again, it is important to note that NAVSUP cannot direct NAVSEA without 
NAVSEA concurrence. 
5. CAO CONOPS:  Competency Aligned Organization Concept of 
Operations for the Naval Air Systems Command and the Affiliated 
Program Executive Offices, 25 August 2010 
This manual describes the Competency Aligned Organization Concept of 
Operations (CAO CONOPS) used by NAVAIR and the PEOs, which emphasizes the 
shared relations of each of the three fundamental CAO CONOPS elements; 
competencies, PEOs and Program Management Offices, NAVAIR Headquarters, 
Warfare Centers, and Fleet Readiness Centers.  NAVAIR transitioned to a competency 
aligned organization between 1995 and 1997.  This transition was the a result a 1989 
Defense Management Review (DMR), which called for streamlining the acquisition 
chain, eliminating time-consuming bureaucracy, consolidating related functions, and 
lowering costs through personnel reductions. Aviation Program Executive Offices were 
established to manage major acquisition programs and systems acquisition.  NAVAIR 
devised and put into practice a new way of operating founded upon the three fundamental 
elements: competencies; Program Executive Offices and Program Officers; and NAVAIR 
Headquarters, Warfare Centers and Fleet Readiness Centers.     
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Integrated Program Teams (IPT) were put into place to plan, manage, and carry 
out acquisition and life cycle management.  IPTs are product-focused and responsible for 
meeting the cost, schedule, and performance guidelines of their programs.  Team 
members come from different competencies and work together as a team but do not work 
directly for the IPT Lead: they are responsible to their boss in the functional area that 
provided the team member to the IPT.  NAVAIR Headquarters (HQ), Naval Air Warfare 
Centers (NAWC), and Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC) are the major components of 
NAVAIR’s command structure and are centers of capability that provide IPT members.  
Figure 1 illustrates the operating principles that guide NAVAIR.   
This manual is one of the most useful sources of information found for this 
project.  It is not a step-by-step description of how NAVAIR conducts day-to-day 








Figure 1.   NAVAIR Operating Principles (From NAVAIR, 2010) 
Competencies 
• The CAO aligns people to  
professional communities of 
practice known as 
Competencies. 
• Competencies supervise 
personnel, develop them 
professionally, and deploy them 
to teams to do their work. 
• Competencies are responsible 
for the people, policies, work 
processes, tools, mission 
facilities, and core technologies 
that support PEOs, Program 
Managers, teams, and other 
customers. 
• Competencies are nationally 
structured to perform 
seamlessly across NAVAIR 
HQ, the NAWCs, and the FRCs 
with the help of local 
Competency leadership. 
• Competencies continuously 
improve their processes and 
capture and share lessons-
learned across programs. 
• Competencies exercise business 
and technical authorities to 
prepare products and 




• Work is performed on teams, 
not decomposed by 
organization or site. 
•  IPTs are multidisciplinary 
product-focused teams 
responsible for cost, 
schedule, and performance. 
•  PMAs/IPTs draw their 
support from NAVAIR’s 
Competencies. 
•  Technical/Professional 
Conscience is respected as a 




• Defined by mission and 
geographic location and lend 
transparency to command 
operations such that 
geographic differences 
become invisible. 
• Provide the infrastructure, 
social, financial, and 
investment framework 
within which teams and 
Competencies operate. 
•  Interface with local 
communities and other 
agencies. 
•  Manage resources (facilities, 












This section addresses several recent and specific audits of DoD inventory 
management, and the recommendations from those audits.  Specifically, it reviews two 
GAO reports, a Naval Audit Service report and a DoD commissioned study conducted by 
the Logistics Management Institute.  Each of these reports provides very useful insight 
into ISS management, further motivating our study.   
1. GAO Report: Defense Inventory Management Actions Needed to 
Improve the Cost Efficiency of Inventory   
In its report “Defense Inventory: Management Actions Needed to Improve the 
Cost Efficiency of Inventory,” published in December 2008, the United States, 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) classified the Department of Defense’s 
(DoD’s) inventory management as a high-risk area (GAO, 2008).  Specifically, the Navy 
has experienced inventory deficits as well as excess inventory during the examination 
time period (GAO, 2008).  The purpose of the examination was to identify inventory 
validities while ensuring good stewardship and fiscal practice.   
GAO found that the Navy’s inventory management did not align with the 
requirements spanning from 2004–2007.  They also found that demand forecasting 
effectiveness was limited and requirements for items changed frequently after purchasing 
decisions were made.  The examination identified billions of dollars in excess inventory 
when compared against the annual requirements listing, which was due to a lack of 
adjustment of certain inventory management practices in response to unpredictability in 
demand.  GAO recommended that the Navy strengthen its inventory management by 
incorporating cost efficiency metrics and goals, evaluating and improving demand 
forecasting procedures, revising inventory management practices to better accommodate 
demand fluctuations, and enhancing oversight though the chief and deputy chief 
management officers (GAO, 2008). 
Another specific recommendation was: 
To improve the management of the Navy’s secondary inventory, the 
Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy, in 
conjunction with the Commander, Navy Supply Systems Command, and 
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the Commander, Naval Inventory Control Point, to revise inventory 
management practices to incorporate the flexibility needed to minimize 
the impact of demand fluctuations. Specific attention should be given to 
revising practices regarding initial provisioning management, on-order 
management, and retention management. (GAO, 2008, p. 5) 
This recommendation drives to the heart of this project.  Better practices at initial 
provisioning will result in less excess throughout the Navy Enterprise.  However, while 
this recommendation is for NAVSUP and NAVICP, those entities do not control most 
initial outfitting.  Working with NAVSEA and NAVAIR, which control platform 
configurations, will yield more fruitful results.   
2. GAO Report: DoD’S 2010 Comprehensive Inventory Management 
Improvement Plan Addressed Statutory Requirements but Faces 
Implementation Challenges.   
In 2011, GAO released a study titled, “DoD’s 2010 Comprehensive Inventory 
Management Improvement Plan Addressed Statutory Requirements But Faces 
Implementation Challenges.”  This report found that DoD spends billions on material that 
is later found to be excess.  DoD reported,  
it currently manages more than 4 million secondary inventory items 
valued at more than $91 billion as of September 2009.1 However, DoD 
reported that $10.3 billion (11 percent) of its secondary inventory has been 
designated as excess and categorized for potential reuse or disposal. 
(GAO, 2011, p. 1) 
Further, $15.2 billion exceeds the authorized allowance but is categorized as an economic 
retention item.  Economic retention is used for low dollar value items where the re-
procurement cost is anticipated to exceed the holding cost.  Basically, across DoD there is 
over $25 billion in excess secondary inventory. Section 328 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 required the Secretary of Defense to 
provide Congress with a plan for how to reduce the inventory of excess material.  In 
accordance with the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, the Department of Defense developed a 
plan that addressed the eight required elements of the law and included an additional 
ninth element that was not required by law.  The nine elements are (GAO, 2011, p. 5): 
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(1) A plan for a comprehensive review of demand-forecasting procedures to 
identify and correct any systematic weaknesses in such procedures, 
including the development of metrics to identify bias toward over-
forecasting and adjust forecasting methods accordingly. 
(2) A plan to accelerate DoD’s efforts to achieve total asset visibility, 
including efforts to link wholesale and retail inventory levels through 
multi-echelon modeling. 
(3) A plan to reduce the average level of on-order secondary inventory that is 
excess to requirements, including a requirement for the systemic review of 
such inventory for possible contract termination. 
(4) A plan for the review and validation of methods used by the military 
departments and DLA to establish economic retention requirements. 
(5) A plan for an independent review of methods used by the military 
departments and the DLA to establish contingency retention requirements. 
(6) A plan to identify items stored in secondary inventory that require 
substantial amounts of storage space and shift such items, where 
practicable, to direct vendor delivery. 
(7) A plan for a comprehensive assessment of inventory items that have no 
recurring demands, including the development of (a) metrics to track years 
of no demand for items in stock; and (b) procedures for ensuring the 
systemic review of such items for potential reutilization or disposal. 
(8) A plan to more aggressively pursue disposal reviews and actions on stocks 
identified for potential reutilization or disposal. 
(9) A Plan to Address Cross-Functional Improvements for Inventory 
Management. 
 
This study evaluated DoD’s plan and determined that it is aggressive and will be 
challenging.  During an oral debriefing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Supply Chain Integration stated, “DoD is fully engaged in executing the plan to improve 
inventory management practices (GAO, 2011, p. 8).” This report was very useful for 
providing overall prospective of DoD inventory management.  
3. Naval Audit Service Report:  Reporting of Sponsor-Owned Material 
and Government-Owned Material  
The Naval Audit Service, at the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy (Acquisition and Logistics Management), conducted an audit of SOM management 
in 2010.  This audit, entitled, “Reporting of Sponsor-Owned Material and Government-
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Owned Material (Audit Report N2011-0011), was released on 22 December 2010.  It 
focused on measuring compliance with SECNAVINST 4440.33, which was developed to 
help the Navy meet statutory financial accounting standards of the Chief Financial 
Officer Act of 1990.  The auditors selected three Program Executive Offices (PEO) to 
review; PEO Integrated Warfare Systems, PEO Carriers, and PEO Land Systems (Marine 
Corps).  The audit found that, while the requirements of SECNAVINST 4440.33 were 
adequate to meet the needs, they were unclear as to who should review the report.  
Additionally, while the instruction required reporting of SOM/GOM, there were no 
clearly delineated repercussions for a failure to comply with the instruction.  Finally, the 
audit found that while auditing only 5% of the DON PEOs/PMs their data accuracy was 
projected to be 98.6% accurate (NAS, 2010).  The Naval Audit Service found that DATA 
were not reported due to a lack of clarity in the instruction. Specifically: 
We determined, through discussion with the PEOs and PMs, that their 
reason for not reporting SOM/GOM was the lack of clarity and direction 
in the SECNAVINST regarding reporting requirements. We also 
conducted an online survey, contacting non-reporting PEOs’/PMs’ points 
of contact to further determine the problem. The responses indicated a lack 
of understanding of the definition of SOM/GOM, and that PEOs’/PMs’ 
data was not being relayed to DASN (A&LM).  Because 95 percent of 
PEOs/PMs did not report SOM/GOM data, DASN (A&LM) cannot ensure 
that DON is utilizing SOM/GOM to meet Fleet material requirements. 
(NAS, 2010, p. 2) 
Basically, they cannot verify that SOM/GOM is being managed effectively due to issues 
with the SECNAV instruction.  As a result, SECNAVINST 4440.33 is currently under 
revision.   
4. Logistics Management Institute Report: Life Cycle Forecasting 
Improvement:  Causative Research and Item Introduction Phase 
As previously mentioned, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 
required DoD to develop a plan to improve government inventory management.  Prior to 
this, the Office of the Secretary of Defense hired Logistics Management Institute (LMI), 
a Virginia-based consulting company, to conduct a study on demand forecasting for 
secondary inventory.  LMI states that, “improved forecasting should reduce inventory 
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excesses and shortfalls and, thereby, provide for more effective and efficient materiel 
support” (Logistics Management Institute [LMI] 2010).”  Subsequently, the LMI study 
became part of the congressionally mandated DoD plan for improving inventory 
management.  Appendix D of the report specifically addresses interim support.  The 
report provides a very good overview of interim support but has one major fallacy. The  
fallacy is that the LMI report states:  
Maritime programs rarely use ISS because the need for interim support for 
ships is less for several reasons. First, the long lead times required to 
activate a new ship generally provide sufficient time to acquire and stock 
its initial outfitting list before the ship begins operations without the need 
for interim support.  Secondly, due to comparatively low demand rates and 
space availability constraints aboard ships, maritime systems have lean 
retail stocks and rely primarily on wholesale stock for support. (LMI, 
2010, p.  D-1) 
While the long lead time does allow sufficient time at initial construction, this statement 
assumes that the ship’s configuration is static throughout its life cycle.  Ships are 
continually upgraded and new systems are added after a ship is built.    Further, 
NAVSEA does use ISS, but unlike NAVAIR it is not a centralized process, it is 
conducted by the individual program offices.  The space constraints and low demand on 
ships are poor arguments because the low numbers of ships procured makes the ISS 
process even more important for maritime programs.  Finally, ISS allows time for the 
wholesale system to respond to upgrades and installations.  If ISS is not used, the ship 
may find itself in the position of needing parts that the wholesale system does not know 
are needed. 
C. PROCEDURES 
This paper focuses on NAVAIR and NAVSEA ISS processes.  As such, it is 
important to understand how each activity performs its ISS functions.  This section 
reviews the current process at both NAVAIR and NAVSEA; Chapter IV, which discusses 
our findings, discusses the process in depth.  This is provided to give a general overview.   
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1. NAVAIR Interim Supply Support 
NAVAIR uses a third-party logistics contractor that utilizes two contractor-
operated warehouses to store and distribute ISS inventory.  These warehouses are located 
in Beaufort, South Carolina and North Island, California, shown in Figure 2. These ISS 
warehouses act as stock points for contract receipts and for satisfying fleet Interim 
Support Allowance List (ISAL) requisitions. NAVAIR has further partnered with 
NAVICP-P for the management of the ISS items. NAVAIR utilizes a functional area 
organization where  each function is defined by a numerical code.  NAVAIR 6.8.2 is the 
Logistics office that specifically deals with ISS.  It retains overall control of the process 
and financial responsibility.  NAVAIR 6.8.2 is located at NAVAIR headquarters in 
Patuxent River, Maryland.   
The contractor facilities are straightforward.  They warehouse, inventory, and 
issue material in accordance with NAVAIR’s direction.  This direction comes from 
NAVICP-P where the actual inventory management occurs.  When an item is purchased, 
it is shipped directly to the contractor warehouse and when an issue is needed the issue 
paperwork is sent to the contractor warehouse.  This provides a centralized location and 
the ability to easily track ISS through all phases from acquisition to end usage.  
Additionally, the contractor runs a website, http://www.navairiss.com, which allows an 
authorized user to query the physical status of NAVAIR’s ISS.  
Management at NAVICP is conducted through a team known as Logistics 
Elements Managers (LEM).  NAVICP has thirty-five LEMs assigned to individual 
projects (Saywn, 2011). Even though the LEMs are NAVICP employees, it is clear from 
our conversations that they view themselves as part of the NAVAIR team.  LEMs 
coordinate with the Program Management Offices and come to an agreement with the 
Program Management Offices as to the quantity and selection of spare parts to buy for 
the ISS period.  Once a specific LEM has concurrence from the Program Office, the LEM 
will make the purchase.  For extended ISS periods, the LEMs may budget and buy for 




Figure 2.   Locations of ISS Contractor Facilities (From Sayen, 2001) 
2. NAVSEA Interim Supply Support 
While NAVAIR ISS is centrally managed and planned, NAVSEA has maintained 
the very Navy-centric idea of delegating to the lower level.  At NAVSEA, the individual 
program offices are responsible for their own ISS and determine how they want to 
manage it.  While NAVSEA has several facilities similar to NAVAIR’s facilities, they 
are not mandated for use.  Some program offices work closely with NAVICP 
Mechanicsburg (NAVICP-M) for their ISS while others choose to maintain strict control 
of their ISS. 
The ISS process at NAVSEA begins with the program office deciding to install 
new equipment.  At this point, the program managers prepare a Program Support Data 
(PSD) sheet for procurement of spares and repair parts (Cutchall, 2010).  The PSD is how 
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budget requests are tracked by the comptrollers at NAVSEA.  Once funding is provided, 
the program offices can chose to work with NAVICP-M for their ISS purchases, or they 
can use their own personnel to make purchases and manage their ISS inventories.  Naval 
Sea Logistics Center (NSLC) is a NAVSEA organization in Mechanicsburg, PA next 
door to NAVICP-M, acting as an interface between NAVSEA program offices and 
NAVICP.  Further, NSLC tracks and maintains logistics data for NAVSEA.  NSLC has 
identified that when the program offices manage their own ISS, it sometimes leads to a 
gap at the material support date (MSD), leaving the NAVICP unaware of the new system 
being installed, and unprepared to assume organic support for the new system.   
NAVSEA sponsors a program called Push to Pull.  This program receives 
material at a NAVSEA Staging Facility and holds it until it needs to be issued to the 
ships.  This is similar to the central management conducted by NAVAIR and can 
alleviate the aforementioned issue of material not being available at MSD because when 
a program uses the Push to Pull program NSLC coordinates with NAVICP to assure a 
seamless transition at MSD.  Ultimately, the choice to use the Push to Pull program rests 
with each individual program office; therefore, the results of the Push to Pull program are 
mixed.   
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The remainder of this paper examines current business practices of NAVAIR and 
NAVSEA in order to make a policy recommendation as to how to best transfer ISS 
material custody from NAVSEA to NAVSUP while maintaining NAVSEA control of the 
disposition of that material.  This project started looking at the overarching concept of 
OM&S which has been highly criticized by the Government Accountability Office and 
Naval Audit Service for the amount of excess material in this category.  It was narrowed 
to ISS, a subset of OM&S because OM&S was too diverse to effectively be examined in 
one project.   
Dr. Keebom Kang, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School wrote a technical 
report for the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics in 1998 entitled “DoD 
Inventory Management Cultural Changes and Training in Commercial Practices.”  It 
found thirteen causes of DoD excess inventory (Kang, 1998, pp. 12–13): 
1. Incentives for Item Managers, Supply Personnel and Users 
2. Unpredictable Demand and High Stockout Cost 
3. Lack of Asset Visibility 
4. Government Contracting Regulations 
5. Monopsony and Lack of Competition 
6. Inexperienced Personnel and High Personnel Turnover and Multiple 
Inventory Managers 
7. National Stockpile Requirements and Economic Considerations 
8. Geographically Dispersed Commitments and Separate Service 
Transportation Networks 
9. Decrease in Requirements and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
10. Lack of Customer Confidence and Receiving the Wrong Consumable Part 
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11. Support of Allies 
12. Poor Estimates During Initial Procurement Planning 
13. Demilitarization Costs  
Of these thirteen causes, three provide a useful framework with which to examine the ISS 
transition and how best to accomplish it.  The three causes are: Incentivizing Item 
Managers, Supply Personnel and Users; Lack of Asset Visibility; and Poor Estimates 
During Initial Procurement Planning.  The other ten causes of excess material are 
important but not as relevant to the analysis of how to transition ISS to NAVSUP 
custody. The data analysis examines the visibility of ISS while review of policy will 
examine the incentives for item managers and estimates during initial procurement 
planning.  Process mapping was conducted to develop a clear picture of how processes 
work at NAVSEA and NAVAIR.    
B. DATA ANALYSIS  
This project examined both numerical data and process flows from NAVSEA and 
NAVAIR.  The data specifically examines the material purchased in the interim period 
and the usage of that material.  This data provided visibility about the use of ISS material 
at both NAVSEA and NAVAIR. Visibility, for this paper, examined the whole of an ISS 
period and determined what items were utilized compared to the number of items that 
were procured to support the ISS period.  The data analysis conducted will provide a 
measure of the ISS visibility.   
These researchers relied primarily on the use of data collected from the Program 
Managers and logisticians at NAVAIR, NAVSEA, and NAVSUP.  Supply databases and 
records from NAVSUP, NAVSEA, and NAVAIR program managers were essential to 
developing a project report analysis and  determining the visibility of  ISS material.  Both 
NAVAIR and NAVSEA provided this project with a wealth of data about their ISS 
procurements and demand.  The data was provided in a Microsoft Excel format, which 
allowed for easy analysis.  The NAVAIR was obtained from NAVAIR’s contractor-run 
website, www.navairiss.com.  Access to this site is limited to official use and must be 
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obtained in accordance with NAVAIR procedures.  This website contains ISS data from 
2001 to present day.  It allows quick and easy access to on-hand quantities and demand 
data and provided output as either a Microsoft Excel or Adobe pdf file.  NAVSEA’s data 
was not centralized in one database.  The personnel at NAVSEA were very helpful and 
provided a lot of data, but the data sets did not contain individual demand data; instead 
the demand data provided were a summary of all demand for a particular item.  The 
demand data did not include direct contractor delivery to an end user, warranty work, or 
depot-level issues.  The lack of this important data did not lend itself to determining how 
effective the inventories were being utilized.  Each program maintains its own ISS 
program and there is not a standard system or format for the data.  The NAVSEA 
personnel who provided the data had to manually extract the data from various systems.  
These data were consolidated from NAVSEA and NAVICP-M records.  It is not 
inclusive of all NAVSEA ISS, but of major systems from a sample of NAVSEA’s 
programs.  This should be sufficient for the level of data analysis used in this project.   
C. REVIEW OF POLICY 
To better ascertain how the current systems operate, site visits to NAVSEA and 
NAVAIR were conducted.  The purpose of the visits was to analyze current inventory 
practices and processes with regard to item manager incentives and estimates during 
initial procurement planning.  A detailed review of current instructions and command 
policies that govern OM&S disposition was conducted. Day-to-day operations were 
assessed and documented, which enabled researchers to collect data and obtain a 
thorough understanding of organizational inventory procedures and what motivates item 
managers to take the actions they take.  
D. PROCESS MAPPING 
Process mapping takes complex written instructions and provides a visual flow 
chart that allows users to more easily understand the complex facets of a process.  We 
introduce process flow diagrams for the current practices at NAVAIR.  NAVSEA does 
not have a standardized process for the entire enterprise; therefore, a single process flow 
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for their organization cannot be developed.  The process map illustrates how the process 
currently works and where the process can be enhanced.  The process map was developed 
utilizing existing instructions and policy as well as information provided by program 
managers and logisticians who currently use these processes in their day-to-day business.  
It is not directly related to the framework used to examine ISS, but is very helpful for 
understanding the processes used to manage ISS.   
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on data analysis.  As previously mentioned, the data for this 
project comes from three principal locations: historical numerical data, instructions and 
policies, and data provided by personnel working at NAVSEA, NAVAIR and NAVSUP.  
Each of these sources provides an interesting perspective on ISS; each is slightly 
different, but they all drive to the same points, that visibility is important and the 
incentives for logistics planners and initial forecasting make a difference in the ISS that is 
purchased and have caused excess ISS.  The data is discussed in the order listed above 
while the conclusions and recommendations regarding this data is presented in  
Chapter V.   
B. NUMERICAL DATA 
1. NAVAIR Data Summary 
Using the aforementioned NAVAIR website, a list of 77 active aircraft ISIL 
header files were downloaded.  The header file shows all systems currently being 
supported using the ISS process and identifies each of them through the use of a ISIL 
number.  After retrieving the list of ISILs the data for each individual ISIL were 
downloaded in a Microsoft Excel format.  Finally, the Issue Report, which contains data 
about all issues made throughout the ISS period, was downloaded in a Microsoft Excel 
format.  These files were merged into a master file that contained each ISIL with its 
associated NIINs and the demand data for those NIINs.   
The ISIL file provided the following information: ISIL number, National Item 
Identification Numbers (NIIN), National Stock Number (NSN), the Special Material 
Identification Code (SMIC), Source Maintenance and Recoverability (SM&R) code, 
vendor Part Number, Name, Unit of Issue, Unit Price, Net Price, Ship Code, Quantity 
Ready for Issue, and the quantity Not Ready for Issue.  The Unit Price is the cost of a 
new item with no carcass to turn in, it will be used for initial issues or when the carcass is 
damaged beyond the capability of repair.  The Net Price, is the cost the Navy associates 
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with a repairable item for which there is a turn-in carcass that can be repaired and 
returned to the Navy for utilization.  This is equivalent to the amount that an  auto parts 
store charges for an item that can be rebuilt and sold.  Once consolidated, the 77 different 
ISILs in this report contained 11,009 individual NIINs, the total dollar value of those 
NIINs and their on-hand stock levels utilizing the Unit Price was $332,824,233.53.   
The issue reports contained the ISIL number against which the issue was made, 
the Document Number, the NIIN, the Unit of Issue, the Quantity issued, the Unit 
Identification Number to whom the issue was made, the date of the issue, the Fund Code, 
Project Code and Issue Priority.  The issue report showed a total of 21,640 issues.  These 
issues were recorded over the period of January 2001 until December of 2010.  Actual 
demand is shown in Table 1.  The majority of the demand occurred between 2008 and 
2010.  This is because under most circumstances the ISS period is short.  However, there 
are some outliers. ISIL 00A08 has an Material Support Date of 31 December 2020.  This 
ISIL is an engine for the V-22 Osprey and will continue to be supported through ISS for 
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Table 1.   NAVAIR ISS Demand for Currently Active ISILs from 2001–2010 
The issue reports and the consolidated ISILs were combined in order to analyze 
the demand and issue data.  A method for examining visible consumption was developed 
to compare the processes at NAVAIR and NAVSEA.  The visible consumption was 
derived by dividing the number of individual NIINs that received demand during the ISS  
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period by the total number of NIINs purchased for an individual system.  Visible 
consumption only shows if a NIIN has demand, it does not consider multiple demands 
against a NIIN.          
Table 2 shows the visible consumption of each individual ISIL at NAVAIR.  
After determining the visible consumption of individual ISILs, the mean visible 
consumption for all 77 was 31.2% with a standard deviation .373 a median of .0784.  The 
maximum consumption was 100% of the original inventory and the minimum 
consumption recorded was 0%.  This was just the visible demand for each ISIL and did 
not accurately show the number of items purchased that received demand.  The same 
numbers were analyzed again using a different method.  The total number of NIINs 
purchased for all 77 ISILs was divided by the total number of NIINs that received 
demand for those 77 ISILs.  Analysis of the demand data this way showed demand on 
66.27% of NIINs.  This means that of all ISILs active at the time of data collection, 
almost 2/3 of the items showed demand.  This large deviation can be accounted for by 
maturity of the system.  Figure 3 is a chart that shows the visible consumption (number of 
NIINs that have received demand) compared to the number of quarters until the system 
reaches its Material Support Date (MSD).  The trend line shows a steady increase from 
0% visible consumption for systems that are 34 quarters from MSD to 46% for items that 
are at MSD.  Once again the example of ISIL 00A08, the engine for the V-22 Osprey 
demonstrates this point.  The Logistics Element Managers purchased 514 total NIINs and 
213 showed demand for a total of ISS visible consumption of 41.4%.  This program has 
another nine years to improve its ISS effectiveness.  The quantity of NIINs in each ISIL 
did not have a major impact on the demand shown for the ISILs.  The mean visible 
consumption for ISILs that contained ten parts or fewer was 38.5%, for those between 11 
and 100 NIINs was 22.4%, and for ISILs with greater than 100 NIINs was 31.1%.  This 
is because the quantity of NIINs in an ISIL is not related to the maturity of the ISIL, it is 































00A08  514  213  0.4144 00B51 21 12  0.5714
00A64  1  0  0.0000 00B52 107 22  0.2056
00A66  508  1  0.0020 00B53 5 0  0.0000
00A75  679  0  0.0000 00B54 8 1  0.1250
00A80  3  3  1.0000 00B56 6 5  0.8333
00A83  94  16  0.1702 00B57 46 3  0.0652
00A84  33  14  0.4242 00B63 22 12  0.5455
00A85  161  122  0.7578 00B64 15 5  0.3333
00A95  3460  1470  0.4249 00B65 6 4  0.6667
00A96  3000  1475  0.4917 00B66 7 6  0.8571
00A99  14  12  0.8571 00B67 2 2  1.0000
00B01  20  0  0.0000 00B68 2 1  0.5000
00B03  2  0  0.0000 00B69 2 0  0.0000
00B04  1  1  1.0000 00B72 4 2  0.5000
00B05  86  10  0.1163 00B75 7 3  0.4286
00B07  158  16  0.1013 00B76 1 1  1.0000
00B09  4  0  0.0000 00B77 3 0  0.0000
00B10  71  2  0.0282 00B78 3 0  0.0000
00B12  18  0  0.0000 00B79 3 2  0.6667
00B15  28  1  0.0357 00B80 81 0  0.0000
00B18  7  0  0.0000 00B83 1 0  0.0000
00B21  108  0  0.0000 00B85 51 4  0.0784
00B22  12  10  0.8333 00B86 2 0  0.0000
00B23  4  0  0.0000 00B87 1 0  0.0000
00B24  28  1  0.0357 00B88 2 0  0.0000
00B25  3  3  1.0000 00B89 4 4  1.0000
00B26  27  2  0.0741 00B90 27 1  0.0370
00B28  1  1  1.0000 00B94 5 0  0.0000
00B32  172  2  0.0116 00B97 7 1  0.1429
00B33  3  1  0.3333 00B98 4 0  0.0000
00B34  11  9  0.8182 00C01 21 0  0.0000
00B35  6  5  0.8333 00C02 8 0  0.0000
00B37  4  2  0.5000 00C03 2 0  0.0000
00B38  4  0  0.0000 00C04 1 1  1.0000
00B43  3  3  1.0000 00C05 6 0  0.0000
00B46  802  32  0.0399 00C06 30 0  0.0000
00B47  58  0  0.0000 00C08 16 0  0.0000
00B49  12  7  0.5833 00C09 36 0  0.0000
00B50  313  184  0.5879 Total 21639 14341  0.6627
Table 2.   ISIL Visible Consumption 
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2. NAVSEA Data Summary 
NAVSEA provided data in the form of Microsoft Excel Spreadsheets for this 
project.  NAVSEA personnel had to manually pull the data from various systems.  This 
arduous manual task proved to be very time intensive.  The NAVSEA data set contained 
2,565 unique Repairable Item Codes (RICs) with a total of 17,225 line items.  The RIC is 
used to identify individual systems, similar to NAVAIR’s ISIL.  The 17,225 line items 
contained 7,891 line items with a valid  NIIN.  Another 9,232 were Interim Navy Item 
Control Numbers (I-NICNs) identified by the first two characters being LL and followed 
by an additional six characters.  I-NICNs are problematic because they are locally 
assigned and do not correlate back to the DoD stock system and cannot be requisitioned 
by the end user using standard requisition procedures.  Table 3. is a sample of the data set 
showing I-NICNs.  Finally, 102 were non-NIIN/NICN, they used only an OEM Part 
Number in the data set’s NIIN block.  This is more problematic than the use of I-NICNs 
because different manufacturers will use the same part number to identify different items.  
Therefore, the OEM must be known when ordering using a part number, and the OEM 
must still be manufacturing that part.  Only 45.8% of the NAVSEA ISS material 
examined were tracked using valid NIINs.  This drives down the visibility of the 
NAVSEA’s data.  It is a manually intensive process for NAVSEA and to NAVICP 
logistics personnel to transition I-NICNs and Local Item Control Numbers to NSNs.  
Further there is a greater potential for demand data to be lost in the process which will 









RIC  COG  Nomenclature  NIIN 
Issue 
Quantity 
88A990205  0J  VALVE THERMAL EXP  LLH556876  8 
000A2183  0O  CIRCUIT CARD ASSEMB  LLH562206  8 
0R71342008  0J  HDD IBM ULTRASTAR  LLH563033  1 
A00575A568  0J  COMPACT DISK  LLH792179  1 
H000000385  0O  COMPUTER, DIGITAL  LLH792644  1 
00039440  0J  I/O EXPANDER BOARD  LLH7A4133  1 
99A000080  0J  TRANSPONDER TST CAB  LLH7A5695  1 
005750377  0J  KEYBOARD,DATA ENTRY  LLH7A8281  1 
Table 3.    Sample NAVSEA Data 
Given the aforementioned constraints of the data not showing demand for direct 
contractor delivery, warranty work, or depot level issues NAVSEA’s data the 2565 
unique RICs had an average visible consumption of 18.36%.  This does not necessarily 
mean that only 18.36% of NAVSEA’s ISS material is being utilized, it only shows that 
the data provided only accounted for the usage of 18.36% of the material in the 2,565 
unique RICs.  More items may have been used, but they did not appear in the records.  
Table 4 shows a summary of the RIC visible consumption.  At this point when analyzing 
NAVAIR’s data, the researches took a second measure of visible consumption which was 
to divide the total number of NIINs that have been retrieved from inventory by the total 
number of NIINs purchased.  When the same analysis was conducted on this data set the 
resulting visible consumption was 11.2%.  The data set did not include the MSD so the 
analysis of proximity to MSD can only be assumed; it cannot be shown.  The number of 
NIINs, I-NICNs or Part Numbers contained within each RIC does not affect the visible 
consumption of the individual RICs.  There were 2,565 RICs; 2174 RICs contained 
between 1 and 10 NIINs, I-NICNs or Part Numbers and had a visible consumption of 
20.0%, 380 RICs had between 11 and 100 NIINs, I-NICNs or Part Numbers and had a 
visible consumption of 9.2% and eleven RICs had over 100 NIINs, I-NICNs or Part 














Table 4.   NAVSEA Visible Consumption Summary 
The data also shows that there is a lot of duplication of effort. The 2,565 unique 
RICs contained a total of 17,225 NIINs, I-NICNs, or Part Number identified parts.  
Analysis of the data showed that, there were only 9944 unique NIINs, I-NICNs, or Part 
Numbers.  Meaning that the other 7,281 were duplicates and that different programs were 
managing the same parts.  Two of the NIINs appeared in 86 separate RICs.  If these two 
NIINs are truly being managed by 86 individual programs the effort to procure these 
parts is being duplicated 86 times and NAVSEA is missing out on the opportunity to 
reduce the labor, lead time, and administrative costs involved in these procurements.  
Both items are circuit cards and one has a unit price of $11,741 while the other has a unit 
price of $10,975.  Table 5 shows the breakdown of NIINs, I-NICNs and Part Numbers 
(generically referred to as NIINs) and the number of RICs in which they appear  The data 
shows that 26.08% of NAVSEA NIINs are used in more than one RIC which provides a 
lot of potential savings if there is consolidation in this area.  Dr. Kang’s paper stated that 
once visibility is improved inventory managers can, “reduce total inventory and cost, 














Table 5.   Occurrences of NIINs in RICs 
C. POLICIES 
Considering the actual data showing how ISS is managed at NAVSEA and 
NAVAIR, it is important to examine the instructions and policies that have led to those 
results.  While both organizations have a method for acquiring and managing ISS they 
are distinctly different.  NAVAIR has a standardized and fairly rigid method of managing 
the ISS process, while NAVSEA places the onus of management on the individual 
programs.  The following is a discussion of the NAVAIR process followed by a 
discussion of the NAVSEA process. 
1. NAVAIR’s Capabilities Aligned Organization 
NAVAIR is a functional organization that places each function in an Air Number.  
The Air Numbers are:  Air-1.0  Program Management, Air-2.0 Contracts, Air-4.0 
Research & Engineering, Air-5.0 Test & Evaluation, Air-6.0 Logistics, and Air-7.0 
Corporate Operations & Total Force (NAVAIR, 2011).  While each of these elements has 
its own roles and responsibilities, they are expected to operate collaboratively to balance 
program cost, schedule, and performance. That said, a degree of constructive tension 
between them is expected and welcomed  (NAVAIR, 2010). 
The organizational structure can best be illustrated in Figure 4.  In essence, the 
members of the Integrated Program Teams (IPT) have two different bosses, each with a 
slightly different objective.  This matrix structure intentionally creates tension in the IPT 
because NAVAIR believes: 
Healthy, constructive debate promotes trust, reveals opportunities and 
alternatives, forges partnerships, and motivates individual elements to act 
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as one. Since everyone is associated in one way or another with these 
elements—aligned to a Competency, supporting one or more PEOs/PMAs 
and other customers, and conducting their work at HQ, a NAWC, or an 
FRC—narrow allegiances should more naturally give way to working 
interdependently for the greater good. (Naval Air Systems Command. 
[NAVAIR], 2011, p. 5) 
 
Figure 4.   NAVAIR Operating Relationships (From NAVAIR, 2011, p.5). 
Basically, NAVAIR has adopted a matrix organization with the philosophy that 
an Integrated Product Team (IPT) beholden to a single goal or mission will result in an 
IPT that is not affected by other major areas of concern.  When an IPT does not have a 
single goal, but the goals of each individual in mind, it will work together and make 
better decisions while striving to complete a mission without sacrificing cost to meet a 
schedule or achieve performance.  This is an important distinction to understand because 
in this type of environment it is much more difficult for logistics personnel to sacrifice 
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sound logistics concepts for the purpose of appeasing a Program Manager who wants 
100% readiness. Logistics personnel are also responsible to AIR 6.0, which is driven by a 
slightly different metric that incorporates the effectiveness of logistics purchases.  To 
achieve high levels of readiness, approaching 100% support cost increases drastically 
because parts that have a low rate of failure are purchased in excess, regardless of its low 
rate of failure.  The desired service level becomes very important in a constrained 
environment.  Figure 5 shows the theoretical relations between requisition fill rates and 
investment in inventory.  It is a generic example and the data does not tie into this report.  
The key point is that a 100% fill rate is exponentially more expensive than a lower 
service level that will still meet the program needs.  
 
Figure 5.   Simplified Example of the Tradeoff Between Safety Stock and Service Level  
With regard to ISS, NAVAIR has a straight forward process.  It starts with the 
program office procuring a new system or upgrading an existing system that requires ISS.  
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The budget for these new systems is not germane to this discussion.  Once the budget is 
approved and the schedule determined, the NAVAIR Assistant Program Manager for 
Logistics works with the NAVICP LEMs to develop a document called the Provisioning 
Statement of Work (PSOW).  This PSOW is basically a master plan for the new system.  
There are two key items from the PSOW that are vital to a successful implementation, the 
Provisioning Performance Schedule (PPS) and the Provisioning Candidate Checklist.    
The PPS is a schedule of the specific events with due dates and responsibility 
assigned to all of the key events and deliverables necessary for provisioning.  Figure 6 is 
a sample PPS taken from the Provisioning Analyst Desk Guide.  Neither the Initial 
Operational Capability nor the MSD show a responsible activity because they are a 
collaborative effort between NAVAIR, NAVICP, and the Contractor responsible for the 
implementation of the system.  Use of the PPS helps to ensure that the process is 
completed smoothly and that the milestones for implementation are met.     
 
Figure 6.   Provisioning Performance Schedule (From NAVAIR, 2008) 
PROVISIONING PERFORMANCE SCHEDULE (PPS) 
 
End Item:  Night Scope Viewing System 
Contractor: Bad Eyes    Contract Nr: N00019-01-D-E239 
 
RESPONSIBLE      CALENDAR DATE 
ACTIVITY   EVENT    OF EVENT 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
NAVICP   Issue PSOW     TBD 
NAVAIR/Contractor  PSOW Funded    TBD 
NAVICP/Contractor  Guidance Conference    TBD 
Contractor   Submit Interim Support Items List  TBD  
NAVICP   Release Interim Support Items Order  TBD 
NAVAIR/Contractor  Product Baseline (PCA/FAT)   TBD 
NAVAIR/Contractor  Maintenance Plan Document Approval  TBD 
Contractor   Submit PTD and EDFP to NAVICP  TBD 
NAVICP   Item Selection Process (ISP)   TBD 
NAVICP   Data Validation and Files Load  TBD 
NAVICP   Provisioned Items Order (PIO) Release TBD 
Contractor   Interim Support Assets Delivered  TBD 
    Initial Operational Capability (IOC)  TBD 
Contractor   PIO Asset Delivery    TBD 
    Material Support Date (MSD)  TBD 
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The Provisioning Candidate Checklist is a form used to determine if parts should 
be supported as ISS or if they should be supported through other means.  The basic rule is 
that if an item already exists in the federal supply system it will not be supported as ISS 
because that particular item is not interim.  The full Provisioning Candidate Checklist is 
included as Appendix C.   
2. Logistics Element Managers and NAVICP 
In the early 1990s, NAVAIR implemented several changes to its system that 
improved the oversight and visible consumption of its assets.  In 1991, the first dedicated 
NAVAIR ISS warehouse was opened at North Island, California.  This was in response to 
a NAVAIR working group formed to reduce excess inventory cost. In addition, NAVAIR 
transitioned from a predominantly on-site contractor supported process for ISS to a 
system that created more visibility throughout the standard supply system.  The transition 
from contractor support to NAVICP-P allowed for easy tracking, stocking, and recording.  
In 1994, a second warehouse was added in Beaufort, South Carolina to handle the extra 
storage requirements needed.  In 1994, the functional responsibility for ISS management 
was outsourced to NAVICP-P, which hired 35 Logistics Elements Managers (LEMs) to 
carry out the day-to-day management (Sayen, 2010).   
NAVAIR has a clear partnership with NAVICP.  The LEMs work for NAVICP 
but interface daily with their specific program offices at NAVAIR. While the LEMs work 
for NAVICP, and are accountable to NAVICP for their jobs, the funding for the parts 
they manage is derived from NAVAIR.  The programs are NAVAIR programs and, 
therefore, the LEMs must interface with their NAVAIR program offices to determine 
requirements and NAVAIR’s desires for how funding is to be spent.  Once again 
NAVAIR has pitted two distinctly different goals against one another to ensure an 
efficient operation. 
The LEMs typically have 10 years of item management experience and 
personalities compatible with customer satisfaction while meeting their NAVICP goals.  
They have very distinct business rules as to which items will be purchased during the ISS 
period.  The major business rule that affects ISS management is the first question an 
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LEM asks, “does this part already have a NIIN?”  If it already has a NIIN, then the part is 
not procured as ISS or added to an ISAL.  It is referred to the appropriate location for 
support.  This has the effect to limit duplication of effort.  If a part is common to all 
thirty-four LEMs at NAVICP, only one of them will have to support that particular NIIN.  
Each system will be supported by that person, and all purchases will be grouped to 
provide better buying power.  This also can have the effect of reducing safety stock levels 
because the safety stock level will not be carried by each LEM; instead, they are pooled 
centrally.  Further, demand data is reliably collected and the aggregate totals allow for 
better forecasting. 
Figure 7 is a flow chart illustrating the NAVAIR Provisioning Candidate 
Checklist.  We created this to show the process and all key decision points. 
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Figure 7.   NAVAIR Provisioning Candidate Checklist Flowchart 
3. NAVSEA’s Hierarchical Structure  
NAVSEA by contrast does not have a specific process that all programs are 
required to use.  Its stated mission is to, “engineer, build, and support the U.S. Navy’s 
fleet of ships and combat systems” (NAVSEA, 2011).  NAVSEA accomplishes its 
mission through a hierarchical structure, described in Appendix A.  Individual program 
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managers are responsible for their program’s performances and the product team works 
for the program manager, incentivized by that structure.  Discussions with several 
logistics personnel at NAVSEA indicated that their mission is to ensure operational 
readiness to the fleet and during ISS they will buy as many of the parts as allowed by the 
funds available.    
Under this hierarchical structure, the product team is organized with one goal that 
was summarized in the NAVSEA mission statement.  The entire team’s goal is 
incentivized by supporting the ship.  Program management’s triple constraints, cost, 
schedule and performance drive the team’s actions and behaviors.  With regard to ISS 
purchases the cost constraint, seems to be the weakest of the triple constraints.  When a 
system costs a factor of ten more than the individual parts it is easy to neglect the 
individual spares given their relative expense compared to the whole system. Further, the 
logistics personnel at NAVSEA are more concerned about not having a needed part, than 
about purchasing the correct inventory levels for all parts.  Determining the correct 
allowance list means that logistics personnel must incur risk of not having a part that is 
needed.  There is no incentive in this organization for taking that risk as the logistics 
personnel answer only to their program manager.      
Similar to NAVAIR, NAVSEA gets its initial data from the original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) developing a new system to determine what material will be 
purchased in the ISS period.  The OEM recommendations are then subjected to 
engineering analysis to estimate failure rates.  Given the lack of historical data 
procurement decisions are based on limited information and estimates.  Similar to with 
NAVAIR, individual programs determine what parts to buy.  However, NAVSEA does 
not have standardized business rules.  The programs that provided data for this project 
utilize what is called a Program Support Data (PSD) sheet, a common form, but it is not 
required of all programs and therefore is not used universally.  The PSD sheet is a 
budgeting tool, which lists pertinent technical data for an item that should be supported as 
well as a deployment schedule for those systems.  It does not specifically look at 
supportability but it does force the people utilizing the PSD sheet to coordinate with 
NAVICP Mechanicsburg.   
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The major finding at NAVSEA was that everything is program centric.  The 
instructions do not provide specific detail on how ISS should be managed, they leave the 
specific detail to the individual program offices.  NAVSEA has been highly successful 
accomplishing its main mission, utilizing this program centric system.  However, in 
recent years, NAVSEA has been criticized for the volume of excess material resulting 
from procurements. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Both NAVSEA and NAVAIR have systems in place to determine what material 
will be purchased in the ISS period.  NAVSEA’s system is decentralized, and largely left 
to the individual program managers.  NAVSEA’s logistics personnel are incentivized to 
support their program regardless of cost.  NAVAIR has a standardized process and has  
partnered with NAVICP-P to outsource the ISS portion of their systems acquisition.  This 
incorporates conflicting goals to ensure the trinity of cost, schedule, and performance are 
balanced.  Both organizations struggle with procuring material that has no historical data 
upon which to build their allowance.  Chapter V delves into this projects findings. 
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
1. Introduction 
In a 1998 Technical Report, entitled “DoD Inventory Management Cultural 
Changes and Training in Commercial Practices,” Naval Postgraduate School Professor 
Dr. Keebom Kang found thirteen causes of DoD excess inventory (Kang, 1998, pp. 12–
13): 
1. Incentives for Item Managers, Supply Personnel and Users 
2. Unpredictable Demand and High Stockout Cost 
3. Lack of Asset Visibility 
4. Government Contracting Regulations 
5. Monopsony and Lack of Competition 
6. Inexperienced Personnel and High Personnel Turnover and Multiple 
Inventory Managers 
7. National Stockpile Requirements and Economic Considerations 
8. Geographically Dispersed Commitments and Separate Service 
Transportation Networks 
9. Decrease in Requirements and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
10. Lack of Customer Confidence and Receiving the Wrong Consumable Part 
11. Support of Allies 
12. Poor Estimates During Initial Procurement Planning 
13. Demilitarization Costs  
Of these thirteen causes, six are directly relevant to this project.  NAVSEA’s inventory 
could better be managed by taking action on: (1) realigning the incentives for Item 
Managers, (3) eliminating the lack of visibility, and (12) improving the poor estimates 
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during initial procurement planning.  NAVSEA should also have very valid concerns 
about: (2) unpredictable demand and high stockout cost, (5) monopsony purchases and 
lack of competition, and (10) lack of customer confidence through receiving the wrong 
consumable part.  The other seven causes are important considerations, but not as 
relevant to this project.   
2.   Incentivizing Item Managers 
DoD contains many hierarchal organizations that focus on mission readiness at all 
costs.  It is very common for a ship’s Commanding Officer to direct the ship’s Supply 
Officer to ensure that certain systems are never in need of parts.  This incentive will drive 
the Supply Officer or his Logistics Specialists to order excess quantities of parts for that 
system.  They are incentivized not to disappoint their Commanding Officer.  In the short 
term, the practice of hoarding parts can help an individual ship stay operational, but in the 
long term it has a negative effect on the supply system as a whole by showing demand 
where none exists, and creating shortages by multiple units stockpiling parts.  Further, 
when a unit hoards parts it creates a lack of trust in other units who will also start 
hoarding parts.  Dr. Kang’s 1998 study provided a very good example of this from the 
Army’s deployment to Saudi Arabia in 1992.  There, Army units ordered items greatly in 
excess of their needs.  Their excess ordering resulted in shortages of material for follow-
on units.  In the end, “40,000 Sealand containers were sent to the Arabian Gulf during 
Desert Shield/Storm.  About 22,000 of these were never opened” (1998, p. 17).  
Everyone involved was acting on behalf of their own incentives: no unit in combat wants 
to be without.  Unfortunately, misaligned incentives cause people with good intentions to 
take actions detrimental to the organization, and the supply system as a whole.   
NAVSEA’s hierarchical system has similar misaligned incentives such that the 
logistics personnel benefit from buying in excess, because there are severe consequence 
for not having a part when needed  The logistics personnel for a particular weapon 
system work directly for the Program Manager.  Their evaluations are completed by the 
Program Manager and therefore there is a high level of professional risk involved in not  
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ordering a part that may never be needed.  Fear of stock-outs resulting in a deployed 
ship’s not accomplishing a mission results in buying excess material.  Kang’s 1998 study 
stated: 
Focusing on material availability at any cost without regard for high 
inventory levels leads to ambiguous objectives (local versus global 
effectiveness). DoD must review all the factors including organization 
structure, evaluation and incentive/reward systems, and take drastic 
initiatives that will lead to system improvement. (Kang, 1998, p. 29) 
The problem of availability at any cost still exists and needs to be addressed. 
NAVAIR has a structure that incentivizes Item Managers differently; they are not 
NAVAIR employees, they are NAVICP-P employees and they are physically located in 
Philadelphia at NAVICP-P, not at NAVAIR Headquarters in Patuxent River, Maryland.  
At NAVAIR, they do not answer solely to the program office but, the program office is a 
very vital and important part of their job.  LEMs are the Item Managers for ISS, their 
projects are funded by the NAVAIR program to which they are assigned.  Their customer 
is NAVAIR, but they do not have the same stress for mission accomplishment that 
NAVSEA places on its logistics personnel.  NAVAIR retains the right to keep certain 
systems under NAVAIR and not have LEMs make the buys or manage the parts; 
however, this is the exception, not the rule.  This allows NAVAIR logistics personnel to 
focus on major systems acquisition and logistics while outsourcing the management of 
parts. 
3. Lack of Visibility 
NAVSEA data have several exceptions that lead to the lack of visible 
consumption.  Specifically, the data sets did not capture demand for direct  contractor 
delivery to ships or warranty repairs made by a contractor after installation.  The absence 
of standardized processes led program managers to develop their own data tracking 
systems that cannot be shared by the users and other shareholders.  In some cases, the 
first time a ship’s Supply Department finds out about a new system is when the 
maintainers have used all of the contractor-provided spares.  Also, the data sets did not 
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capture issues made by depots for repairs.  The lack of demand data makes modeling 
difficult and inaccurate even after sufficient demand data should have been captured. 
NAVAIR PEOs and PMAs utilize Integrated Program Teams (IPT) to plan, and 
manage, system life cycles.  IPTs are product-focused and responsible for meeting the 
cost, schedule, and performance guidelines of their program.  In addition, the constant 
interaction between the two fosters a joint alignment with added visibility of material 
support of the entire ISS period.  LEMs, while not on the IPT, liaison with the program 
office on a regular basis to ensure that they are supporting the IPT in an effective manner.  
Kang’s study stated:   
Better coordination between the weapons systems program managers and 
inventory managers might avoid the generation of some excess 
inventories. For example, it is important that program managers keep item 
managers informed immediately of design changes that might affect 
current procurement. Also, as program offices usually know the very latest 
information concerning when and the rate at which a weapons system will 
be phased out, getting this information to item managers quickly might 
reduce or avert procurement actions. If program offices know of reliability 
improvements that should reduce demand, inventory managers should be 
informed. By working together, these two groups can eliminate the 
deleterious impact their actions sometimes have upon each other. (Kang, 
1998, p. 30) 
The major advantage of NAVICP-P’s LEM system is that it facilitates mutual 
coordination.  While not on the IPT, the LEMs feel that they are part of the team and 
coordinate with the program offices to ensure they are providing appropriate support.  
This also enhances readiness at the Material Support Date when NAVICP Item Managers 
take over management of those parts because they have reliable demand data.   
4. Poor Estimates During Initial Procurement Planning 
There is no substitute for historical failure rates in a real environment, so 
estimates for initial planning will continue to create problems for the Program 
Management Offices and whomever is managing their ISS.  NAVAIR and NAVICP both 
have incentives that encourage buying everything an OEM recommends and in as large 
of quantities as possible.  However, more investment should be made into determining 
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what will be needed as there exist more scientific forecasting methods that balance 
service level with inventory levels.  Further, NAVSEA had numerous systems that used 
the same parts.  By consolidating management of those parts, more demand data will be 
captured and safety stock levels can be lowered through pooling effects.    
5. Unpredictable Demand and High Stockout Cost 
When new weapons systems are introduced accurately determining the amount of 
spares necessary to support the system is a difficult task that relies on theoretical data or 
historical data based on similar systems, there is no historical data for that specific 
system.  Many factors that drive forecasts are based on a mathematical approach, such as 
mean time between failures, historical trends, wartime mission requirements and 
operational profiles.  The factors add difficulty in estimating the correct amount of spares 
to support a system.  This ultimately leads to what is considered a “best guess” to support 
the system.  In addition to the forecasting, operational factors that affect NAVSEA assets 
are worth mentioning.  Deployment schedules for ships have increased, which has led to 
more wear and tear on the systems.  Also, environmental factors such as salt water could 
degrade the system greatly.  Thus, predicting the assets’ mean time between failures 
varies greatly with individual systems.  This could cause Item Managers to order excess 
parts for the system to avoid high stock out costs and prevent ships from not being able to 
meet their mission requirements. Dr. Kang’s 1998 study stated: 
Current DoD performance measures tend to promote high levels of 
inventory and reflect the traditional emphasis on maximum organizational 
effectiveness. DoD’s prime objective has always been to maintain combat 
readiness. Operating forces often do not have confidence in the ability of 
the supply system to support them, so they hoard items, and deliberately 
order more than they need. The evaluation and incentive/reward systems 
designed under the concept of readiness at any cost discourage 
commanding officers and inventory managers to be efficient by keeping 
low inventory levels. They simply do not have strong motivation to reduce 
inventory level, at the risk of stockout. (Kang, 1998, p. 27) 
The high stockout cost associated with naval assets is a major consideration that 
NAVSEA justly takes into account when supporting a new system.  Upgrades to systems 
vital to the United States National Defense cannot afford failures due to not having parts 
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support.  When considering what parts to buy, it is vital that the system criticality be 
taken into account.  Any changes to NAVSEA’s current business practices must address 
system criticality.   
6. Monopsony and Lack of Competition 
Monopsony is defined as having one customer.  In regard to DoD, it makes sense 
that the military is the only customer for many weapon systems purchased by both 
NAVSEA and NAVAIR.  With such highly specialized weapons systems program, 
managers could be forced to procure more of an asset than necessary to keep a production 
line open, or as safety stock to account for the procurement lead time necessary to 
replenish used parts and avoid stock outs.  Dr. Kang’s 1998 paper stated: 
It only makes sense for the manufacturer to want to produce a large lot 
size and then use its production resources on other items. This increases 
DoD’s inventory, since it must buy and hold more inventory than it could 
if the item were commercially available. (Kang, 1998, p. 10) 
In the data analyzed, many of these specialized weapon systems have common 
parts or components that make up the system.  For example, NAVSEA’s data showed 
that 2,593 of the 9,944 NIINs examined appeared in multiple RICs.  If NAVSEA 
leverages its buys, monopsony becomes less of an issue with those items.  Consolidation 
of the NIINs with multiple occurrences under the control of one Item Manager would 
increase overall visibility of the NIIN, reduce the number of contract actions acquire that 
item and ultimately lead to a lower overall safety stock required for those NIINs.  
7. Lack of Customer Confidence and Receiving the Wrong Part 
Discussion with NAVSEA Logistics personnel show a lack of confidence in 
NAVICP’s ability to support ships due to NAVICP-M’s process for procuring new 
systems.  While changing NAVAIR’s ISS process in the 1990s, it faced many of the 
same issues.  NAVAIR and NAVICP-P worked together to ensure that the business rules 
for ISS were different than for post MSD parts.  Further, as a safety net NAVAIR retains 
the right to purchase items without going through NAVICP.  This occurs as an exception 
not as the rule because NAVAIR contracting personnel are better utilized when focusing 
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on major systems acquisitions, not purchasing spare parts.  Additionally, NAVAIR 
centralized its warehousing of ISS in two contractor run facilities that physically manage 
the ISS material.  All ISS parts are sent to fleet units from these sites allowing for added 
visibility and control.  NAVSEA should adopt NAVAIR and NAVICP-P’s system to 
manage ISS material from IOC to MSD.  This would allow logisticians throughout the 
Navy organization to accurately track their inventory and maintain custody.  
As mentioned earlier, NAVAIR PEOs and PMAs utilize Integrated Program 
Teams (IPT) and other team structures to plan, manage, and carry out acquisition and the 
life cycle program.  IPTs are product-focused and responsible for meeting the cost, 
schedule, and performance guidelines of their program.  In addition, the constant 
interaction between the two fosters a joint alignment with added visibility of material 
support of the entire ISS period.  NAVICP-P employees Logistics Element Managers 
(LEM) to work with the IPT and ensure that the IPT’s needs are met.  According to Dr. 
Kang,  
The consequences of a decrease in requirements for an item might be 
partially averted by training the weapons system program office and 
inventory control point to understand each other’s priorities and 
capabilities. (Kang, 1998, p. 26) 
If NAVICP-M utilizes an LEM approach to ISS it should help allay NAVSEA’s 
lack of confidence because the Program Management Offices will interface with their 
specific LEMs on a daily basis.  This will further aid both organizations because 
NAVICP-M will be fully involved in the ISS process from the inception of a new system 
through the Material Support Date when NAVICP assumes full responsibility for 
supporting these systems.  This will ensure that NAVICP-M records demand data for the 
ISS period to adequately support fleet needs.  The assignment of LEMs to specific 
programs will provide NAVSEA Program Management Offices a single point of contact 
whose sole purpose is the help them support new systems.   
B.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
After careful analysis of the data, it is evident that both organizations have room 
for improvement in their ISS management.  Specifically, NAVAIR can improve the ISS 
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management database to reflect asset location and demand history.  The website interface 
is user friendly; however, additional improvement can be applied.  The ability to locate 
the physical location of an asset can aid inventory planners with estimating transportation 
costs and timeframes.  For instance, if an asset is required in Norfolk, VA, and there are 
assets in both ISS warehouses, Beaufort, SC and North Island, CA, it would be more cost 
effective and save shipping time to have it come out of South Carolina. 
NAVSEA should transition to a centralized ISS program.  This would allow PEOs 
and logistics personnel enhanced visibility of their ISS assets.  The realignment of 
inventory personnel serving in inventory management duties moves toward a greater 
production of efforts and free the program office personnel to focus on major systems 
acquisition.  When people are focused on what they do best, they are more productive 
and efficient in their duties. 
Our research benefited from NAVAIR’s ISS website, which allowed us to quickly 
and effectively pull the data necessary for analysis.  Further, while NAVAIR still puts the 
onus of ISS on the Program Office, NAVAIR works well with NAVICP-P to ensure full 
spectrum support.  This is most evident while speaking with the LEM’s at NAVICP-P 
who feel like as much a part of the NAVAIR team as anyone we spoke with at NAVAIR.   
NAVSEA does not have the same relationship with their NAVICP-M 
counterparts.  Both organizations would benefit from some cross-cultural awareness of 
how and why the other organization does things the way they do.  They would also find 
value in developing cross functional teams that work together to determine what material 
should be purchased during the ISS period.  NAVSEA, given its mission, “to keep ships 
at sea,” understandably wants to ensure that a ship never fails due to a lack of parts.  
NAVSUP with a focus on “cost wise readiness” attempts to optimize customer needs 
based on financial constraints.  From the 50,000-foot perspective of this project these 
organizations are not aligned in their goals.  While the differing goals cause frustration at 
the working levels they ensure that neither organization overtakes the other in its goals. 
NAVSEA would benefit from having NAVICP-M manage its ISS and allowing 
NAVSEA to focus on its core competencies.  This could be best accomplished by a spirit 
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of partnership that must be developed.  The LEM system at NAVICP-P has been very 
effective at developing a team mentality and a similar system could provide the same 
benefits for NAVSEA and NAVICP-M.  To accomplish this NAVSEA should: 
1. Retain the right by exception to make ISS buys if the LEM cannot meet 
their needs. 
2. Provide funding for ISS through its program offices to ensure it that ISS 
purchased is what the program needs. 
3. Fund and provide oversight for consolidated ISS warehouses.  This will 
force coordination between NAVICP-M and NAVSEA as well as 
providing NAVSEA more comfort with the process 
In developing an LEM system NAVICP-M should: 
1. Assign LEMs to specific programs to provide: 
a. a single point of contact 
b. updates to the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List 
c. familiarity with unique program requirements 
d. further study is necessary to determine the exact amount of LEMs 
necessary 
2. Ensure LEMs have a minimum of 10 years’ experience as Item Managers 
3. Ensure people hired as LEMs have the personality to balance program 
office desires with NAVICP-M objectives of cost-wise readiness 
4. Consolidate management of common NIINs to a single LEM 
5. Assign NSNs at the earliest possible moment 
The quick and early assignment of NICNs and I-NICN to legitimate NIINs in 
both organizations is imperative to have an effective ISS management system.  When 
temporary stock numbers are used in the supply system, inefficient redundancies of time 
and effort are spent tracking and managing parts.  Total visibility is gained when a 
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temporary stock number is transitioned to NIIN.  The establishment of the NIIN allows 
for legitimate demand and issue tracking.  With historical demand captured, inventory 
managers and provisioning personnel can make educated and informed future decisions 
on sparing levels.   This is perhaps the most important recommendation regardless of who 
manages ISS. 
C. IMPACT 
If an LEM system is implemented then everyone involved will see those 
advantages.  NAVSEA will be allowed to focus on its core competencies without using 
its vital resources for ISS management.  This will also improve the visibility of ISS 
material and allow for more efficient use of the material.  NAVICP-M will be better able 
to incorporate ISS items into the COSAL which will improve system support at the 
Material Support Date.  Inventory management is a core competency of NAVICP-M and 
its expertise will benefit both NAVSEA and the fleet.  Finally, to quote the late Captain 
Hillary King, “its all about the enlisted sailors!”  This system will help the end users by 
providing added visibility on parts.  Fewer man hours will be needed ordering parts 
because the system will be centralized.  The COSAL will provide ISS support, allowing 
the idiosyncrasies of ISS to be worked out at the systems command and NAVICP-M 
level.  ISS should be seamless to the end user.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
Given that the data sets did not contain demand data, and that the data collected 
from the two organizations were not directly comparable, it was difficult to generate 
substantial data analysis.  Due to the large number of invalid NIINs and minimal amount 
of demand information, the results varied.  It was difficult to compare both organizations 
on similar grounds based on the data analyzed.  However, an attempt was made to 
evaluate the total number of NIIN issues to NIIN purchases.  As a percentage of the 
NIINs procured during the ISS period, the total issues from each organization was 
divided by the total amount of items procured.  The ratio, or percentage, allowed a near 
equal comparison. 
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Additionally, the type of weapon system managed by the NAVSEA are typically 
individual assets with limited commonality of parts.  Consequently, the proportion of 
common ISS among different programs is lower than what you would find at NAVAIR.  
Spare parts at NAVSEA are usually of low demand, and spare parts at NAVAIR are 
usually high demand.  Consequently, the opportunities for inventory pooling and safety 
stock reduction at NAVSEA are not the same.  Although process standardization at 
NAVSEA is expected to bring better inventory management and lower excess stocks, it 
should not be expected that it will provide the same performance as what is obtained at 
NAVAIR. 
E. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research is an initial look into transitioning ISS from NAVSEA management 
to NAVICP-M management.  Further research is needed to fully implement any changes.  
A manpower study must be conducted to determine the appropriate number of LEMs 
NAVICP would have to hire to support the new workload.  NAVICP-P employees 35 
LEMs to support four NAVAIR Program Executive Offices but this may not transfer 
directly to NAVSEA’s five Program Executive Offices.  As mentioned previously, 
NAVSEA has a lack of confidence in NAVICP-M’s ability to manage ISS and provide 
the requisite service level.  Two areas for further research arise from this lack of 
confidence.  First, determine the appropriate service level for new systems, a new galley 
system is not as vital as a new weapon and should be treated as such with common 
business rules regarding service level and the new system’s criticality.  Second, this is a 
major change and research should be conducted on getting NAVSEA program office buy 
in and how to build a trusting relationship between the two organizations.  Another area 
for further study is to determine specifically how much inventory NAVSEA currently 
holds and where it is located.  This research should focus on how to consolidate these 
inventories for central management.  Finally, further research is required to determine if 
the Navy’s Enterprise Resource Planning software in its current form will be capable of 
managing ISS material or if it will require software changes to allow for this 
management. 
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APPENDIX A.  STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY 
Operational Units in the United States Navy have a dual chain of command.  
Administratively, they Navy reports to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  The CNO 
is responsible for training and provisioning of the navy.  When a unit is operational it 
works for a Combatant Commander who directs day to day actions of that unit.  Readers 
may be familiar with the Combatant Commander named United States Central 
Command, and commonly referred to as CENTCOM.  CENTCOM is a Unified 
Combatant Commander with responsibility for the central areas of the world which 
include both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Operational units from all branches of the military in 
the CENTCOM area of responsibility work for CENTCOM, not their administrative 
chain of command.  A naval unit in CENTCOM works for CENTCOM for its day to day 
mission, but is still responsible to the CNO for administrative matters such as training 
and provisioning.  More information about CENTCOM can be found at:  
http://www.centcom.mil/about-u-s-central-command-centcom.  More information about 
the CNO can be found at:  http://www.navy.mil.  More information about unified 
commands and general DoD organization can be found at http://www.defense.gov.       
The main way the CNO accomplishes the mission of training and provisioning is 
through the shore establishment.  These are not operational commands and exist solely to 
accomplish the aforementioned missions.  Figure 8. shows the organizations and their 
relationships to one another.  This project examined three systems commands, Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and Naval 
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP).  It is important to note that each of these 
activities are equals answering directly to the CNO, but working together to ensure the 















APPENDIX B.  GLOSSARY 
Accountable Activity: The activity that holds official title to the OM&S and 
whose Line of Accounting was cited in funding the material, unless officially transferred. 
 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP):  is a generic name of a software-based 
management system used by forward-leaning corporations around the world to power 
their crucial “back office” business functions.  The Navy ERP Program uses a product 
from SAP Corporation, which allows the Navy to unify, standardize, and streamline all 
its business activities into one completely integrated system 
 
Government Furnished Material (GFM):  a sub-category of Government Furnished 
Property, consists of inventory or OM&S furnished to a contractor as Government 
property. GFM is typically consumed or expended during the performance of a contract. 
In the case of GFM, the contractor is considered the end-user. When furnished to a 
contractor, inventory and OM&S are considered GFM.  
 
Government Owned Material  (GOM):  Now referred to as Operating Material and 
Supplies (OM&S) is the totality of material assets owned by the Government (i.e., all 
GFM and any CFM to which the Government will have title upon fulfillment of the 
contract) and maintained by the SUPSHIP and/or the contractor are collectively referred 
to as Government-Owned Material (GOM) to include COSAL material, Schedule A, and 
Installation and Checkout (INCO) material, it may also apply to any new ship 




Initial Operational Capability (IOC):  The date applicable to the first attainment of 
capability to effectively field and support a new weapon system or support equipment at a 
Fleet operational site. 
 
Interim Navy Item Control Number (I-NICN):  A unique control number established 
for the purpose of identifying and managing new development items during the ISS 
period and used by Fleet operational sites for MILSTRIP requisitioning and other 
inventory management requirements. 
 
Interim Supply Support Oversite Center:  A NAVAIR funded, contractor operated 
office which receives and validates MILSTRIP requisitions referred from NAVICP-P and 
passes them to the appropriate ISS Warehouse Facility for shipment action.  The 
Oversight Center processes daily Transaction Item Reports (TIRs) and forwards them to 
NAVICP-P to ensure that inventory is accurately reported in the Master Item File (MIF).  
The Oversight Center’s Routing Identifier Codes (RICs) are ‘R43’ and ‘NVC’, 
representing the ISS Warehouse Facilities at NAS North Island and MCAS Beaufort 
respectively.  The ISS Oversight Center also maintains a website which contains all ISS 
project, asset and issue data, www.navairiss.com. 
 
Interim Support Allowance List (ISAL):  A listing of all designated interim support 
spares and repair parts (similar to an AVCAL or SHORCAL) required to support ISS 
equipment at an operational site. 
 
Interim Support Items List (ISIL):  A NAVICP-P approved and NAVAIR funded 
listing of spares and repair parts, parts required to support a new or modified weapon 
system or support equipment during the ISS period. 
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Interim Supply Support (ISS):  Supply and inventory management support for new and 
modified weapon systems and support equipment provided from Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) to Material Support Date (MSD). 
 
Moving Average Cost (MAC):  is the Department of Defense (DoD) preferred method 
for calculating the historical financial unit value of SOM assets (NAVSEA, 2004)..  
 
Material Support Date (MSD):  The date when the supply support or all spares and 
repair parts of new or modified weapon systems and support equipment transitions from 
ISS to the Government supply system.   
 
National Item Identification Number:  A unique nine digit number that identifies each 
item of supply used by the Department of Defense. 
   
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR):  provides full life-cycle support of naval 
aviation aircraft, weapons and systems operated by Sailors and Marines. This support 
includes research, design, development, and systems engineering; acquisition; test and 
evaluation; training facilities and equipment; repair and modification; and in-service 
engineering and logistics support (Naval Air Systems Command, (2011). retrieved via:  
http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=92CEA25.” 
 
 Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA):  develops, delivers and maintains ships and 
systems on time, on cost for the United States Navy. (NAVSEA, 2010) 
 
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP):  provides Navy, Marine Corps, Joint 
and Allied Forces with products and services that deliver Combat Capability through 
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Logistics. NAVSUP manages supply chains that provide material for Navy aircraft, 
surface ships, submarines and their associated weapons systems. (NAVSUP, 2010) 
 
Operational Availability (Ao):  A measure of material readiness, i.e., the expected 
percentage of time that a weapon system or individual equipment is ready to perform its 
specified function in its specified operational environment when called upon at a random 
point in time.   It can be expressed as uptime divided by total time less periods of 
operational inactivity.  Sparing based on Ao is also termed Readiness Based Sparing 
(RBS).  When used to develop an allowance computation, the model computes the 
required secondary items needed to achieve a specified operational goal for the weapon 
system/equipment.  CNO requires that RBS techniques be applied to all new non-nuclear 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I through III programs. 
 
Operating Material and Supplies (OM&S):  Consists of tangible personal property to 
be consumed in normal operations including GFM and CAM.  Excluded are: 
(1) goods acquired for use in constructing real property or in assembling 
equipment to be used by the entity 
(2)  stock-pile materials (strategic or critical) 
(3)  goods held under price stabilization programs, 
(4) foreclosed property,  
(5) seized, forfeited property, and inventory 
(6) GFP, Government Furnished Equipment, Contractor Acquired Property 
and Contractor Acquired Equipment.  
 
Readiness Based Sparing:  This supply support method can be used for  achieving 
Operational Availability (Ao) thresholds specified by CNO.  This method is universally 
applied throughout the weapon system life cycle (including interim support) for new, 
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non-nuclear, non-SSBN acquisition programs in Acquisition Categories (ACATS) I, II 
and III. In reviewing individual programs, it must be determined if RBS can be 
implemented in such a manner so as not to delay the normal provisioning cycle allowing 
for sufficient administrative and production lead time prior to the Material  Support Date 
(MSD).  This methodology uses a given set of reliability a and maintainability character-
istics for a weapon system in order to determine the most cost effective range, depth and 
geographic location of spares and repair parts required to achieve and sustain the Ao 
threshold. 
 
Reason Code:  A one-character field in an AIS that provides rationale for retaining 
material (NAVSEA Commander, 2004). 
 
Repairable Identification Code:  A seven character alpha-numeric code structured in a 
prescribed format so as to identify specific hardware items from the highest to lowest 
level.  These codes are designed to provide a description of the physical relationships of 
the various elements within a given hardware application. 
 
Retention Level:  Defines a recommended quantity of materials to be held as Sponsor 
Owned Material (SOM) that was determined through either a policy decision or derived 
mathematically (NAVSEA Commander, 2004). 
 
Sponsor Owned Material (SOM):  programmatic material required to support program 
managers’ mission requirements for production, life cycle maintenance and installation of 
systems and equipment consistent with their mission charter. The material usage may 
involve, but is not limited to, such tasks as: item fabrication, assembly, testing, 
manufacture, development, repair or research and development (NAVSEA, 2004). 
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Sponsor:  A program manager that provides funding for, and authorizes the procurement 
or the staging of material.  Primarily, the Program Manager (PM) will belong to a 
NAVSEA program office or a program executive office.  The term PM is synonymous 
with Sponsor(NAVSEA, 2004). 
 
Stockpile Materials:  Stockpile materials are strategic and critical materials held due to 
statutory requirements for use in national defense, conservation or national emergencies. 
They are not held with the intent of selling in the ordinary course of business.  
 
Total Asset Visibility (TAV):  defines the capability to provide users with accurate and 
timely information concerning the location, movement, status and identity of material, 
including equipment and supplies, as well as personnel and other resources (NAVSEA, 
2004). 
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APPENDIX C.  PROVISIONING CANDIDATE CHECKLIST 
PROVISIONING CANDIDATE CHECKLIST  
FOR SUPPLY SUPPORT MANAGEMENT PLAN (SSMP) 
AND PROVISIONING STATEMENT OF WORK (PSOW) DEVELOPMENT 





B.  Aircraft Application     ________________________ 
System Designation      ________________________ 
Item Name       ________________________ 
Purchase Req. or Contract Number    ________________________ 
Type/Name of LSAR Database Used              ________________________ 
C.  Type of Acquisition:  (Check One) 
Organic      ___________________ 
Contractor      ___________________ 
 Prime      ___________________ 
 Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) ___________________ 
D.  Contractor or Organic Manufacturing Activity  (Name)    ___________________ 
       (Address)___________________ 
E.  Non-developmental Item    YES           NO   ___ 
Commercial Item      YES           NO   ___ 
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Commercial Test Equipment     YES           NO   ___ 
F.  Other Service Use/Management: 
Army                             Coast Guard  ____________ 
Air Force                             Other (Specify) ____________ 
NAVICP-Mech                           N/A   ____________ 
Marine Corps, Albany, GA _____________ 
G.  Will a Repair Analysis be performed?     YES               NO    ___ 
 
H.  Maintenance Philosophy?  (Check one) 
O to D   _______ 
O, I and D  _______ 
I and D  _______ 
Depot Only  _______ 
O Only  _______ 
O to I   _______ 
O and I  _______ 
I Only   _______ 
I.  Source of Depot Level Repair?  (Check One) 
NADEP  _________ 
Inter-service (Specify)_________ 
Commercial  _________ 
J.  Is this a New System? 
YES    _____ 
NO     _____ 
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If Yes:  Is Interim Support Required?   ____________ 
  Is Interim Component Repair Required? ____________ 
  Who will Administer? Activity ____________ 
      Code  ____________ 
      POC  ____________ 
      Phone # ____________ 
K.  Does system modify or replace existing system?   _____________ 
 If Yes:  Identify existing system   _____________ 
   Is Interim Support Required?   _____________ 
   Is Interim Component Repair Required? _____________ 
   Who will Administer? Activity _____________ 
       Code   _____________ 
       POC  _____________ 
       Phone # _____________ 
L.  ECP Number for K above  ______________ 
 Approval Date   ______________ 
M.  Support Equipment Recommendation Data? YES              NO ____   N/A  ____ 
 Submitted (Date)                                Revised (Date)  ___________ 
 Approved (Date)                                Revision Approved (Date) ___________ 
 SERD Item No.                                  Revised SERD Item No. ___________ 
 SMR Code            _____________ 
N. LMI Specification Invoked in Acquisition:  (Check one) 
 MIL-PRF-49506       __________ 
 Other Standard or Specification (Specify)    __________ 
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 N/A         __________ 
O.  Who will perform/develop LMI or Supportability Analysis? 
 NAWC/NADEP _____________ 
 CONTRACTOR _____________ 
 OTHER  _____________ 
 N/A   _____________ 





 Provided by: Activity ____________ 
 Code  ____________ 
 POC  ____________ 
 Phone  ____________ 
Q.  System Description: 
 CAGE Code  ____________ 
 Reference Number ____________ 
 Quantity Planned ____________ 








R.  Estimated Number of Line Items to be Provisioned: ___________________ 
S.  Estimated Number of DCN’s                              (For L. 
above.) 
T. Fill in completion dates where applicable and available: 
SCHEDULED ACTUAL 
 ECP Approval                              ____________ 
 CCB Approval                             ____________ 
 Contract Award Date                             ____________ 
 Design Freeze (PCA)                             ____________ 
 First Article Test Approval                            ____________ 
 LMI or Supportability 
 Analysis Approval                             ____________ 
 Maintenance Planning 
 Summary Approval       ____________ ____________ 
 IOC (Fleet Delivery)        ____________ ____________ 
 Recommended Material Support 
 Date     ____________ ____________ 
 Recommended Navy Support Date ____________ ____________ 






V.  Signature:  ________________________________ 
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W.  Date Submitted: ________________________________ 
X.  For completion by NAVICP Code 03621: 
  Provisioning Coordinator:   Name     __________________ 
      Code   __________________ 
      Phone    _________________ 
  Weapons Manager:  Name     __________________ 
      Code    __________________ 
      Phone    __________________ 
  PCCN #    _____________________ 
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